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ARE YOUR EYES DECEIVING YOU?: THE EVIDENTIARY
CRISIS REGARDING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
COMPUTER GENERATED EVIDENCE
BETSY S. FIEDLER*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The computer has revolutionized our way of working, thinking, living and playing.1 It should come as no surprise that computers affect what happens in the courtroom.2 Computer
animation and simulation can allow attorneys to transform testimony and data3 into dynamic visual demonstrations, virtually transporting the jury to a re-enacted scene.4
At first blush, one might think computer generated evidence
(“CGE”) should be treated like any other kind of evidence. CGE,
however, warrants special care and caution because of its persuasive
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1. See Mario Borelli, Note, The Computer as Advocate: An Approach to Computer-Generated Displays in the Courtroom, 71 IND. L.J. 439, 439 (1996) (stating “In the 1990’s, our
culture has become computer crazed.”).
2. See Declan O’Flaherty, Computer-Generated Displays in the Courtroom: For Better or
Worse?, Blackstone Press Ltd., available at, http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1996/issue4/oflah
4.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2004) (“More recently, major advances in technology have
meant that computer-generated displays have been unleashed in the courtroom”). A
local example of this emersion can be seen in New York with Courtroom 228, also
known as “Courtroom 2000.” Courtroom 228, located in the New York State Supreme
Court, is wired for real-time transcription of trials and also includes its own IEPS, known
as DEPSTM. Lawyers can reserve the courtroom in advance if they feel they will be
making use of either DEPSTM or CGE. To learn more about the technological capabilities of Courtroom 228, see generally http://www.smarttech.com/profiles/supreme.asp
(last visited Mar. 12, 2004).
3. See O’Flaherty, supra note 2 (“The computer takes all input data (i.e. lighting,
texture and composition of materials that make up the objects) to determine what the
object will look like and renders or calculates a still frame containing the image”).
4. See generally Kristin L. Fulcher, Comment, The Jury as Witness: Forensic Computer
Animation Transports Jurors to the Scene of a Crime or Automobile Accident, 22 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 55 (1996) (discussing computer reconstructions and its impact on the courtroom).
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04/27/2004 12:08:32

C M
Y K

18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 151 Side B

04/27/2004 12:08:32

\\server05\productn\N\NLR\48-1-2\NLR212.txt

296

unknown

Seq: 2

16-APR-04

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

11:27

[Vol. 48

impact,5 its susceptibility to manipulation, and the undue reliance
jurors may place on it because of their familiarity with the medium.
Although courts have admitted computer animations and simulations for about 25 years,6 judges sometimes admit it without paying
sufficient attention to the pitfalls.
Much has been written about CGE and the questions of admissibility that it raises. This note proposes to shift the emphasis.7 Simply stated, the findings of social science research on the effects of
visual persuasion should be used in structuring and applying admission standards.
Part II briefly describes the two main forms of CGE – animations and simulations – and then discusses the evidentiary standards
for admitting animations. Part III examines applicable social science and psychological research, employing the results as tools for
devising more sophisticated standards for determining admissibility. Finally, Part IV proposes some general guidelines as to how
CGE can be used effectively, without undue prejudice, and suggests
ways to incorporate the findings set forth in Part III.
II. THE EMERGENCE

OF

COMPUTERS

IN THE

COURTROOM

A. The Forms of CGE

5. See Neal Feigenson & Meghan Dunn, New Visual Technologies in Court: Directions
for Research, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 109, 110 (2003) (“The use of these technologies, as
well as newer ones such as holograms and immersive virtual environments, is almost
certain to become more persuasive, as lawyers seek to employ what they believe to be
the most advanced and effective means of visual persuasion and as court administrators
strive to accommodate both advocates’ strategies and jurors’ expectations about how
legal cases should be presented.”).
6. See Connors v. U.S., 919 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1991). This was the first time the
government used a computer animated display to recreate the August 2, 1985 crash of
Delta Airlines Flight 191.
7. O’Flaherty, supra note 2.
8. See O’Flaherty, supra note 2.
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CGE takes two main forms, animations and simulations. Computer animation is a powerful method of creating a continuous series of computer-generated images or pictures.8 Like commercial
animation, each image in the series is altered slightly frame by
frame and then recorded in rapid succession in order to mimic ac-
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tual movement.9 A computer animation is a producer’s version of a
witness’ testimony that may result in a helpful illustration of the
testimony.10 Animations should not necessarily be accepted as the
unquestionable truth, however, because the reliability of the animation is completely dependent upon the expert’s testimony and credibility.11 Animations can be used in two ways: 1) a witness on the
stand can present a conclusion and use the animation to illustrate
the findings, or 2) the animation may simply illustrate factual
testimony.12
The second form of CGE is a computer simulation. In essence,
with this form, the computer’s data codes and resulting output become the witness.13 A computer simulation construction has three
steps.14 First, variable sets representing the coordinates of objects
present at the scene are inputted.15 Next, the information is
processed and synthesized to calculate the motion of each object
involved in the incident.16 Finally, the information inputted yields
output in the form of a visual presentation that conforms to the
laws of science and physics.17 Once a computer simulation is “verified by an expert as being scientifically sound and based on scientific knowledge and physical laws, [it] should demonstrate not what
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9. See Karen D. Butera, Note, Seeing is Believing: A Practitioners Guide to the Admissibility of Demonstrative Computer Evidence, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 511, 517 (1998).
10. See Borelli, supra note 1, at 20. See also James E. Carbine & Lynn McLain,
Proposed Model Rules Governing the Admissibility of Computer Generated Evidence, 15 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 8-9 (1999).
11. See Fred Galves, Where the Not-So-Wild Things Are: Computers in the Courtroom, the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Need for Institutional Reform and More Judicial Acceptance,
13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 172, 182 (2000).
12. See Donna Childress, Computer Graphics May Animate Tort Cases, 8 VA. LAWYERS
WEEKLY 869 (1994); James W. Dabney, Patent Win Attributed to 3-D Computer Imagery: Success in a Patent Infringement Lawsuit Demonstrates the Impact of Three-Dimensional Animation,
17 NAT’L L.J., Apr. 3, 1995, at C15.
13. See Elan E. Weinreb, “Counselor Proceed with Caution”: The Use of Integrated Evidence Presentation Systems and Computer-Generated Evidence in the Courtroom, 23 CARDOZO L.
REV. 393, 404 (2001).
14. Id.
15. See Adam T. Berkoff, Computer Simulations in Litigation: Are Television Generation
Jurors Being Misled?, 77 MARQ. L.REV. 829, 831 (1994).
16. Id.
17. See Kevin Lee Thompson, Using Computer Generated Evidence, at http://www.
legalimaging.com/evidence.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2003). The final exhibit that is
presented to the jury involves more than a simple straightforward image. See Berkoff,
supra note 15, at 830.
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‘might’ have happened or what ‘could’ have happened, but what
actually did happen”.18
B. The Evidentiary Standards for Admitting Animations
Demonstrative evidence may consist of charts, diagrams, objects or other items, including movies or computer animations, that
are faithful reproductions of the object or thing being depicted.19
As will be discussed below, to be admitted, demonstrative animations must clarify or illustrate relevant events in the case or provide
useful background information.20 Moreover, the expert who developed the animation must testify as to its validity and accuracy.21
Further, both the source information and the computer processes
used to create the animation are subject to judicial scrutiny for
their reliability and accuracy.22
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18. See Michael Hoenig, Computer Simulations and Other Weapons, 3 N.Y.L.J., Mar. 8,
1993, at 3. The primary difference between the two evidentiary forms is that a simulation can be outcome determinative; the simulation has reached a conclusion on how
the event occurred and provides that conclusion at trial. Quite obviously, simulations
are a more forceful form of CGE as it can present concrete proof as well as perform the
illustrative functions of an animation. The visual force of today’s simulations allow
counsel to show jurors dynamic processes that were previously impossible to depict and
equally difficult to understand with verbal testimony alone. See also Weinreb, supra note
13, at 405; Ronald J. Rychlak, REAL AND DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE: APPLICATIONS AND
THEORY (The Michie Company 1995). (emphasis added).
19. See Butera, supra note 9, at 513-16; See also Richard M. Dunn & Christopher D.
Brown, Getting on the Bus: Some Suggestions on Admitting Computer Graphics into Evidence at
Trial, 65 DEF. COUNS. J. 526, October, 1998; ASHLEY S. LIPSON, ART OF ADVOCACY: DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE § 2.06[1] (1989).
20. See Elaine Chaney, Note, Computer Simulations: How They Can Be Used at Trial
and the Arguments for Admissibility, 19 IND. L. REV. 735, 741 (1986).
21. See text and accompanying footnotes infra Part II.B.
22. See Butera, supra note 9, at 522 (“In addition to the substantive expert [being
found qualified], the demonstrative computer simulation may require the testimony of
the expert who actually produced the simulation.”). See also Robert M. Pozin, Computer
Evidence Part II: Sophisticated Models and In-Court Demonstrations, 15 SPG. BRIEF 43, 45
(1986). To establish a foundation for admission of demonstrative evidence, the following requirements must be met: 1) the demonstrative exhibit relates to other relevant,
competent, and material testimonial, documentary, or real evidence; 2) the witness
whose testimony the demonstrative exhibit illustrates is familiar with the exhibit; 3) the
demonstrative evidence fairly and accurately reflects the other evidence to which it relates; and 4) the demonstrative evidence will aid the trier of fact in understanding or
evaluating the other related evidence. The demonstrative evidence must meet all other
general evidentiary rules that apply to evidences of all forms.
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23. See Dunn & Brown, supra note 19.
24. See Chaney, supra note 20, at 742. See also Vicki S. Menard, Comment, Admission of Computer Generated Evidence: Should There Be Clear Standards?, 6 SOFTWARE L.J. 325,
334-35 (1993); MARK A. DOMBROFF, DOMBROFF ON DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE § 1.15
(1983).
25. See Dunn & Brown, supra note 19, at 528.
26. FED. R. EVID. 901(a) “The requirement of authentication or identification as a
condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”
27. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9) “Process or system. Evidence describing a process or
system used to produce a result and showing that the process or system produces an
accurate result.”
28. See e.g., Cleveland v. Bryant, 512 S.E.2d 360, 362 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (“A computer-generated animation is admissible if it is a fair and accurate representation of the
scene sought to be depicted.”); United States v. Wanoskia, 800 F.2d 235 (10th Cir.
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There are two main advantages to using an animation as demonstrative evidence rather than evidence itself. First, the evidentiary requirements are less stringent then those required for
scientific evidence. Second, the trial judge is granted broad discretion in deciding whether to allow witnesses to supplant their testimony with a demonstrative aid.23 The desire to provide the jury
with the best possible understanding of testimony, coupled with the
trial court’s preference for straightforward explanations, increases
the probability that demonstrative evidence will be found probative.24 The primary downside of using animations solely for demonstrative purposes is that the jury may view the animation only when
the expert testifying uses the animation to illustrate their testimony.
In that situation, the animation may not be received into evidence
and later viewed by the jury during deliberations.25
For an animation to be admitted, Rule 901 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence and the common law test of “substantial similarity”
must be met. All evidence must meet the minimum authentication
requirements of Rules 901(a) and 901(b)(9). Rule 901(a) requires
the production of evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
evidence is what it purports to be.26 Rule 901(b)(9) explains that
FRE 901(a) is met by establishing the reliability of the system used
to create the animation and by establishing the accuracy of the system’s output.27
To lay the proper foundation for admission of an animation,
the testifying witness must state that the CGE portrays the disputed
subject matter fairly and accurately.28 Moreover, the CGE must be
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“substantially similar” to the event it is portraying.29 This standard
dictates that where “an experiment purports to simulate actual
events and to show the jury what presumably occurred at the scene
of the accident, the party introducing the evidence has a burden of
demonstrating substantial similarity of conditions.”30 Although the
animation and the actual event do not have to be identical, an animation will not be admitted unless the test conditions are “so nearly
the same in substantial particulars [as those involved in the episode
in litigation] as to afford a fair comparison in respect to the particular issue to which the test is directed.”31 In general, because “perfect identity between experimental or actual conditions is neither
attainable nor required. . .[,][dissimilarities affect [only] the weight
of the evidence, not admissibility.”32 A close “matchup of condi-

18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 153 Side B

1986) (stating, “. . . a court must take special care to ensure that the demonstration
fairly depicts the events at issue. [This is because] demonstrative evidence, and in particular, reenactments of events, can be highly persuasive. The opportunity for the jury
to see what supposedly happened can accomplish in seconds what might otherwise take
days of testimony.”); see also EDWARD CLEARY et al., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, §215 (3d
ed. 1984) (stating, “[b]y conveying a visual image of what allegedly occurred, one side
can imprint on the jury’s mind its version of the facts.”).
29. See e.g., Clark v. Cantrell, 504 S.E.2d 605, 612 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998), aff’d as
modified, 529 S.E.2d 528 (S.C. 2000) (“Animated evidence [to be admitted, must] mirror the actual facts of the case and [support] relevant testimony.”); see also Kehm v.
Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1983) (permitting an expert to
testify to the differences between experimental conditions and the actual vaginal environment to allow the jury to determine the significance of experimental results in a
product liability action against a tampon manufacturer).
30. Jackson v. Fletcher, 647 F.2d 1020, 1027 (10th Cir. 1981) (establishing a strict
threshold requirement for the admission of experimental and/or demonstrative evidence). See also Randall v. Warnaco, Inc. Hirsch-Weis Div., 677 F.2d 1226, 1234 n.7 (8th
Cir. 1982) (stating that the admission of experimental evidence “very close to a reenactment of the accident . . . could be deemed unduly prejudicial”); United States v. Hart,
729 F.2d 662, 669 (10th Cir. 1984) (excluding admission of a demonstrative hairpin
absent evidence that it was comparable to a hairpin actually used to open a lock).
31. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. v. Ishee, 317 So.2d 923, 926 (Miss. 1975), cited with
approval in Barnes v. General Motor Corp., 547 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1977).
32. Ramseyer v. General Motors Corp., 417 F.2d 859, 864 (8th Cir. 1969) (“Admissibility of evidence depends upon the foundational showing of substantial similarity between the tests conducted and actual conditions. The decision whether to admit or
exclude evidence of experiments in a particular case rests largely in the discretion of
the trial judge and his discretion will not be overturned on appeal absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.”).
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tions” is deemed sufficient to allow the animation to be presented
to the jury.33
Each case must be judged on its own facts, taking into account
the specific purposes for which the animation is submitted.34 The
trial judge has broad leeway in making this determination; a ruling
will not be upset unless it is clearly erroneous.35 Broad discretion in
applying such a vague standard may cause problems if a judge lacks
the expertise to evaluate a sophisticated animation.36 The party opposing admission may challenge the animation by pointing out differences between the animation and actual conditions that might
undercut the animation’s probity.37
Additionally, a computer expert qualified under FRE 70238
must certify the validity, reliability and accuracy of the source of
information, the computer process and the results.39 This can be
done by showing that (1) the computer equipment is accepted in
the field as competent and was in good working order; (2) qualified
computer operators were employed; (3) proper procedures were
followed regarding the input and output of information; (4) a reliable software program was used; (5) the equipment functioned correctly; and (6) the exhibit being employed identified the output
shown to the jury.40
Under FRE 702, expert testimony is allowed “in the form of an
opinion or otherwise” if the trier of fact is potentially helped by such
testimony.41 The “or otherwise” is implicated when animations are
18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 154 Side A

33. Robbins v. Whelan, 653 F.2d 47 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981).
34. Id.
35. Hall v. General Motors Corp., 647 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
36. The discretion of the trial court is generally sustained despite minor variations
in conditions. See, e.g., Four Corners Helicopters, Inc. v. Turbomeca, S.A., 979 F.2d
1434 (10th Cir. 1992) (discussing the effect of loose screws on turbine helicopter engine; exclusion in court’s discretion); Larson v. Meyer, 161 N.W.2d 165 (N.D. 1968)
(allowing different equipment at a different location to illustrate capacity of a tractor to
pull a similar load without overturning). But see Jackson v. Fletcher, 647 F.2d 1020,
1020 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding that an experiment to prove a truck had stopped at
intersection with weight, engine power and different skid marks was an abuse of
discretion).
37. Jackson v. Fletcher, 647 F.2d 1020, 1020 (10th Cir. 1981).
38. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
39. See Weinreb, supra note 13, at 410.
40. Id.
41. FED. R. EVID. 702 (emphasis added). “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
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offered.42 Because demonstrative evidence is offered for limited
purposes, FRE 702 should only be applied to the underlying testimony that forms the basis of the expert’s opinion and not to the
science used to create the animation.43
III. HOW SOCIAL SCIENCE STUDIES CAN HELP COURTS
UNDERSTAND THE POTENTIAL DANGERS OF ANIMATION
Computer animated displays can captivate a jury while simultaneously making intricate, technical issues understandable.44 Computer animations can convey the advocate’s message with realism
and unrelenting power.45 A lay jury, however, may be misled by
forceful visual reconstructions of complex events.46 The vague admission standards for demonstrative evidence may also cause
problems for the proponent of the CGE because the proponent
may not know precisely how to satisfy the foundation require-

18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 154 Side B

fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of
reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case.” Id.
42. See Galves, supra note 11, at 256-60.
43. Id. See also Marc A. Ellenbrogen, Note, Lights, Camera, Action: ComputerAnimated Evidence Gets Its Day In Court, 34 B.C. L. REV. 1087, 1107-08 (1993); Berkoff,
supra note 15, at 840-43.
Finally, FED. R. EVID. 705 is worth noting. This rule allows an expert to testify
through opinions or inferences without testifying to the underlying data so long as the
court does not require such data. This information may, however, be required to be
disclosed on cross-examination. Thus, if only one party has access to animations, the
validity of such evidence will be questioned in the presence of the jury. See Berkoff,
supra note 15, at 842; see also Alan Aldous, Note, Disclosure of Expert Computer Simulations,
8 COMPUTER L.J. 51, 52 (1987).
44. See Wesley R. Iverson, Animation Takes the Stand; Judging the Effectiveness of Computer Animations in the Courtroom, COMPUTER GRAPHICS WORLD, Nov. 1991, at 48; Robert
F. Seltzer, Computer Animated Evidence Has its Day in Court, MICH. LAW. WEEKLY, Apr. 20,
1992, at S2; see also Menard, supra note 24, at 327.
45. See Weinreb, supra note 13, at 395 (stating, “However, once computer technology is used either for presentation of evidence or as actual evidence in visual format, it
leaves an impression upon a person’s mind that cannot easily be erased. Moreover, that
impression is likely to be perceived as one of truth. Both judges and jurors more easily
give credibility to televised information. If Peter Jennings says it happened, it
happened.”).
46. See Saul M. Kassin & Meghan A. Dunn, Computer-Animated Displays and the Jury:
Facilitative and Prejudicial Effects, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269 (1997).
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ments.47 With CGE becoming the common medium for evidentiary
displays, all courts should apply admission standards with a clear
understanding of the sophisticated nature of CGE. Social science
studies that discuss the psychological effects of such displays can
assist in this process.48
A. The Work of Saul M. Kassin and Meghan A. Dunn
In 1997, research by Kassin and Dunn provided the first systematic attempt to examine the effect of computer-generated displays on juries.49 Their research was based on earlier work that
suggested computer constructions of past events would likely be
highly persuasive to a jury.50
First, psychological research (in non-legal contexts) shows that
most people are poor intuitive physicists and know little about the
basic laws of motion.51 Consequently, jurors should be quick to believe and place great weight on a computer generated display that
makes this information accessible, understandable and nonintimidating.52
Second, people are strongly influenced by information that is
vivid, easy to imagine, and readily available in memory.53 When

18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 155 Side A

47. See Menard, supra note 24, at 344 (“Consistency not only makes it easier for
judges to rule on admissibility, but also provides proponents of computer simulations
with effective standards when preparing such evidence for admission.”).
48. See Kassin & Dunn, supra note 46, at 280 (“Serious questions being raised
about their [computer animations] impact in court, the policy implications of such
future studies [studies based on the psychology of juror deliberations] may well prove
significant.”).
49. Id. at 271-74.
50. Id. at 270.
51. Id. See also A. Caramazza et al., Naı̈ve Beliefs in “Sophisticated” Subjects: Misconceptions About Trajectories of Objects, 9 COGNITION 117, 117-23 (1981); M. McCloskey, Naı̈ve
theories of motion, in D. Genter & A.L. Stevens eds., MENTAL MODELS (1983).
52. See Linda C. Morell, New Technology: Experimental Research on the Influence of Computer Animated Displays on Jurors, 28 SW. U. L. REV. 411, 414 (1999) (stating, “This finding also supports previous research that established animation makes cognitive tasks
more concrete by supplying visual motion to coincide with verbal cues. Providing the
animation with verbal narration reduces the processing demands on listeners’ shortterm memory and maximizes the likelihood of their successful and accurate encoding
into long-term memory.”); see also L.P. Reiber & A.S. Kini, Theoretical Foundations of Instructional Applications of Computer-Generated Animated Visuals, 18 J. COMPUTER-BASED INSTRUCTION 83, 83-88 (1991).
53. Kassin & Dunn, supra note 46, at 270; see also Brad E. Bell & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Vivid Persuasion in the courtroom, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCH. 654, 654-59
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mental simulation occurs54 (exactly the procedure followed when
observing a CGE), the imagined events, when recalled later, seem
both probable and subjectively more likely to occur.55
Kassin and Dunn relied on Pennington and Hastie’s Story
Model (“SM”) as a foundation for the proposition that CGE could
be persuasive in the courtroom.56 The SM explicitly concerns the
mental mechanics of juror decision-making.57 According to the
model, jurors actively organize the various strands of evidence and
later use common sense to construct a persuasive story of the events
in dispute.58 This finding suggests that CGE, as compared to oral
testimony, may have a powerful effect on jurors by bringing to life a
visual version of the event.59
Kassin and Dunn tested both the facilitative and prejudicial effects of computer generated displays.60 When examined together,

18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 155 Side B

(1985); Kassin et al., Blood and Guts: General and Trial-Specific Effects of Videotaped Crime
Scenes on Mock Jurors, 21 J APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCH. 1459 (1991); Reyes et al., Judgmental
Biases Resulting from Differing Availabilities of Arguments, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL
PSYCH. 2, 2-12 (1980).
54. Mental simulation is a process where people are prompted to imagine a specific occurrence of events.
55. See W.L. Gregory et al., Self-Relevant Scenarios as Mediators of Estimates and Compliance: Does Imaging Make It So?, 43 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCH. 89, 89-99 (1982).
56. See N. Pennington et al., Evidence evaluation in complex decision-making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCH. 242, 242-58 (1986). See also N. Pennington et al., Explaining
the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decision-Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL
PSYCH. 189, 189-206 (1992). The Story Model discussed was conceived in 1986.
57. Kassin & Dunn, supra note 46, at 270-71.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. This note does not examine the facilitative uses of computer-animated displays. The author concedes and agrees that computer animated displays are the most
effective way of communicating information to the jury. However, Kassin & Dunn’s
facilitative hypothesis, when tested, found that when the sequence accurately represented the event in question, judgment accuracy was improved by bringing verdicts
more in line with the evidence. For more regarding social science studies and their
impact on the courtroom, see the Dual Coding Theory, presented by Mayer and Sim.
Their results suggest that multimedia learning occurs when viewers “use information
presented in two formats.” More simply, a participant’s learning is positively affected by
presenting verbal narration and illustrations together. A test of this theory in 1999 by
Linda C. Morrell found that the above principle is applicable in the courtroom. See
Morrell, supra note 52. Participants who viewed testimony with computer animation
recalled information more accurately and with more detail that those who did not view
animations, suggesting that the most effective means of communicating is when CGE is
a factor in the presentation. Animation makes cognitive tasks more concrete by supply-
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the two studies indicated that animated depictions of a physical
event had a greater impact on the jury than equivalent oral testimony, but that the nature of the impact depended on the characteristics of the display.61 Regarding the prejudicial effect of CGE,
the study showed “a sobering distortion in perceptual judgment, as
a sizable number of the participants were misled.”62
Unfortunately, Kassin and Dunn believe that the above results
could underestimate the potential impact of CGE in two significant
ways.63 First, the event used was moderately simple, instinctive to
the naı̈ve physicist, and easy to envision.64 When the CGE depicts
events an average juror does not understand, the effect on the jury
could be magnified.65 Second, participants watched a brief trial
and rendered their decisions immediately afterward.66 Vividness effects in oral testimony, however, are typically more pronounced
when judgments are delayed rather than instantaneous,67 suggesting that the often lengthy time between viewing CGE and deliberations could increase the effect of CGE on jurors.68
B. Gestalt Psychology

ing visual motion to coincide with verbal cues, thereby reducing the processing demands on the listener’s short-term memory.
61. See Kassin & Dunn, supra note 46, at 279.
62. Id. at 270-71. The authors point out, however, that the prejudice prong was
only partially supported by the study.
63. Id.
64. See Caramazza et al., supra note 51.
65. Kassin & Dunn, supra note 46, at 278-80.
66. Id. at 279.
67. Id.; see also Bell, supra note 53; Reyes, supra note 53.
68. See Kassin & Dunn, supra note 46, at 278-79.
69. DONALD E. VINSON, JURY PERSUASION: PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGIES & TRIAL
TECHNIQUES (1993).
70. Id. at 198.
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Gestalt psychology is also useful in understanding how CGE
may affect a jury because it focuses on how people organize visual
information and elements so that they are perceived as a whole.69
The principles of Gestalt psychology, which predict how visual
images will be perceived, include area, closeness, proximity, continuation and symmetry.70 More specifically, within Gestalt psychol-
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ogy, each of these principles can be manipulated.71 As to area, the
smaller the closed portion of an image, “the more it is apt to look
like a complete figure.”72 Areas with closed boundaries or edges
are more likely to be seen as a whole shape.73 Items placed close
together are likely to be assembled collectively in the viewer’s
mind.74 Arrangements that have a small number of interruptions
in a line will be seen as a complete figure.75 Regarding symmetry,
the more symmetrical an area, the more likely it will be seen as a
complete figure.76 By using these principles, a well-designed exhibit could cause jurors to overlook their pre-existing logical understandings and direct their attention to a specific idea, encouraging
them to see what counsel wants them to see.77
C. Learning Processes
Surveys have shown that humans are essentially visual learners;78 87% of the visual information presented to us is retained,
while only 10% of the information we hear is retained.79 Studies
measuring jurors’ information retention shows that jurors were able
to recall 65% of the evidence presented three days earlier if the
evidence was presented through a combination of oral and visual
testimony.80 Still other studies show that jurors focus primarily on
visual evidence and prefer to use it during trial.81 CGE has the capacity to exploit this tendency, possibly relaxing the juror’s critical
18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 156 Side B

71. Id.; see also DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 15-17 (Shelley
Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999).
72. See VINSON, supra note 69, at 198-99.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id. (“The utilization of these basic Gestalt principles in the arrangement of
the elements in demonstrative evidence can encourage jurors to see the relationships
we want them to see.”).
78. See VINSON, supra note 69, at 185.
79. See R. Dennis Donoghue, Demonstrative Exhibits: A Key to Effective Jury Presentations, 369, 371 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course
Handbook Series No. G4-3892, 1992), also available at WL 349PLI/Pat 369 at *371.
80. See VINSON, supra note 69, at 188.
81. See Frederic I. Lederer, The Road to the Virtual Courtroom? A Consideration of
Today’s—and Tomorrow’s—High-Technology Courtrooms, 50 S.C. L. REV. 799, 814 (1999).
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82. See Michael Owen Miller & Thomas A. Mauet, The Psychology of Jury Persuasion,
22 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 549, 563 (1999) (describing how the animation [in question]
caused jurors to ignore the reported physical evidence (as well as a common sense
understanding that things fall straight down)); see also Martha M. Jenkins, ComputerGenerated Evidence Specifically Prepared for Use at Trial, 52 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 600
(1976).
83. See Miller & Mauet, supra note 82, at 563.
84. Kassin & Dunn, supra note 46, at 276.
85. Id. at 279.
86. Borelli, supra note 1, at 455.
87. Id.
88. Craig Murphy, Comment, Computer Simulations and Video Re-Enactments: Fact,
Fantasy and Admission Standards, 17 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 145, 146 (1990).

18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 157 Side A

nature.82 Jurors may be misled by animated displays that are entertaining but are physically and factually far-fetched.83
One study, for example, showed jurors a computer animation
depicting the trajectory of a body going off a building and asked
whether the person slipped and fell, and was therefore negligent,
or jumped, thus committing suicide.84 Jurors were more likely to
find negligence if the animation depicted the body falling straight
down the building even though the oral testimony clearly stated
that the body landed twenty to twenty five feet from the building.
The animation caused jurors to ignore both the reported verbal
physical evidence and the common sense understanding that things
fall straight down.85 Thus, the danger a jury will be misled requires
strict scrutiny as to the accuracy of the displayed information.
Another expert in the field of visual persuasion, Mario Borelli,
hypothesizes that society’s familiarity with the animated medium itself could lead a jury to accept information displayed in this format
as the truth, even if it is not. To quote Borelli, “The fear is that the
highly communicative nature of computer graphics and the myth
of the infallible computer will take the decision out of the jury’s
hands.86 The old adage ‘seeing is believing’ may gain extra force in
this setting.”87 Because television is the main medium today for
gaining information, when evidence is presented in an animated
format that we have become accustomed to viewing, it can become
“not only believable, but virtually unassailable.”88
Another expert, Brian Stonehill, concurs with this rationale
stating, “Computer animation works on a visceral level that quite
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easily bypasses skeptical, rational faculties89. . .[Computer animation] creates psuedo-memories of the event [and the] memorability
of having witnessed the crime itself, but [with] no validity in fact.”90
Thus, viewing an animated depiction could invite a verdict based
upon emotion rather than pure objective fact.91
Opponents of the sensory simulation theory put forth the Dual
Process (“DP”) theory.92 DP Models approach the question of how
people know by viewing information processing as occurring along
a continuum.93 DP theorists recognize that people may not view
evidence with fresh eyes and an open mind.94 Instead, jurors may
rely on prior knowledge, stereotypes, and expectations in examining and weighing the validity of the CGE.95 However, DP contends
there are limits to “automatic processing.”96 People can expend
vast amounts of time and mental energy to assemble decisions, beliefs, and a sense of knowing.97 This more “mindful” strategy98 requires cognitive effort and a will to scrutinize and reflect on the

18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 157 Side B

89. Claire Cooper, Computer Animation on Trial, The San Diego Union Tribune,
Jan. 27, 1993, at E1.
90. Id. The author would like to point out that this fact is only exacerbated when
only one party uses computer-animated displays.
91. See John Selback, Comment, Digital Litigation: The Prejudicial Effects of ComputerGenerated Animation in the Courtroom, 9 HIGH TECH. L.J. 337 (1994) (“This [unfair
prejudice] would certaintly apply to evidence which is more convincing merely because
it appeals to jurors on a visceral level. A decision based on visceral impact is arguably
just as bad as a decision based on emotion.”).
92. Chaiken & Trope, supra note 71.
93. Id. at 13.
94. Id. at 29.
95. Id. at 13.
96. Id. at 29. Automatic processing is a term used to “indicate that perceivers are
so adept at effortless processing that much of their social life proceeds automatically.”
In 1989, Devine concluded through his research that stereotypes are automatically activated, and that only through conscious exertion of the will can people overturn such
thoughts and be unprejudiced. In 1990, Gilbert, Krull and Malone stated that people
automatically believe any assertion put to them, and only subsequently, consider its
truth or falsity through conscious exertion of the will.
97. Chaiken & Trope, supra note 71, at 13.
98. Id. Mindful strategy is “a bottom-up process that requires the exertion of cognitive effort to reflect on and examine the stimulus.”
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stimulus.99 Thus, CGE stimuli may require jurors to go beyond
their “default processing.”100
There are three factors that can cause people to question their
judgments and motivate them to take a “closer look.”101 First, when
feeling uncertain, jurors will be forced to proceed systematically.102
That is, when uncertain about their default judgment, jurors will
exert the cognitive effort necessary to revise their beliefs.103 Thus,
if CGE is so unrealistic that jurors are skeptical, they will become
critical of the display.104 Cognitive effort will overturn the initial
“automatic” response to the CGE, and jurors will take a closer
look.105
Second, when the information is inconsistent with prior beliefs
and expectations, jurors will examine CGE more closely.106 When
the perspective of jurors is contested, the jurors’ confidence in the
judgments arrived at through least-effort processing will be challenged.107 Thus, if the CGE is factually improbable or at odds with
juror expectations, they are more likely to examine the display
critically.
Third, people may simply choose to take a closer look.108 People can be flexible processors and more elaborate processing can
be employed when people want to be more certain of their judgments.109 Jurors may want CGE to be highly accurate. If it is not,
jurors may dismiss it as unreliable.110

18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 158 Side A

99. Id.
100. Id. Default processing can be defined as “where people act in a somewhat
mindless fashion, arriving at their sense of knowing through a top down process
whereby a preconception is imposed on new information. Both default processing and
mindful strategy are two “distinctive paths to arrive at knowledge – paths that individuals have the cognitive flexibility to choose between.”
101. Id. at 29. Bruner coined the term “closer look” in 1957. He used this term to
define the means through which initial automatic responses could later be overturned
with cognitive effort. Id.
102. Id. at 25.
103. Chaiken & Trope, supra note 71, at 25.
104. Id. at 33.
105. See id. at 29.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Chaiken & Trope, supra note 71, at 29.
110. Id.
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Finally, opponents of the sensory simulation theory also suggest that because jurors are so familiar with special effects from
movies and television, they are very unlikely to say “I saw it on a
screen, so it must be true, and now I am incapable of even considering a contrary scenario.”111 Because jurors know that many of the
images displayed in a movie or television program are not real, they
understand that visual images could be manipulated at trial to distort what actually happened.112 The “I saw it on TV so it must be
true” mentality may be even more unlikely when jurors enter the
courtroom and realize they must decide a real case.113 Thus, DP
theorists believe the concern about the unduly prejudicial effect of
CGE is unwarranted. We should respect the ability of jurors to process information objectively and make up their own minds.114
D. Loopholes in the Production Process
Even assuming jurors will exercise good judgment and use
common sense, they still may be misled.115 Critics argue that the
animation production process may subtly distort reality.116 These
critics assert that everyone involved in the production of an animation - the animator, attorney, expert witness, and the party - has a
vested interest in the outcome of the case.117 The individuals who
offer the CGE into evidence are the same people who design, create, and edit the evidence.118 Moreover, the animator often subse-

18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 158 Side B

111. See Galves, supra note 11, at 218-19. See also Ralph Adam Fine, Feature: Object at
Your Risk, 58 OR. ST. B. BULL 19, 19 (1998) (“Jurors want to do what is right; they are
looking for the ‘truth’ of the dispute – what really happened. According to a 1992
Brookings Institution report, ‘Jurors take their responsibilities very seriously and attempt to reach fair and just results.’”).
112. See Galves, supra note 11, at 219.
113. See id. at 218-19.
114. See id. at 219.
115. See Lederer, supra note 81, at 817 (“To the best of our knowledge, this [improper manipulation] is technically possible. . .Given sufficient funds and time, we believe that the technology exists to permit at least a reasonable possibility of altered or
totally fabricated electronic evidence”).
116. See Jane B. Baird, New From the Computer: “Cartoons” for the Courtroom, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 6, 1992, at C5.
117. See Ellenbrogen, supra note 43, at 1099-1100; see also Science and Technology
Week: Videos are Dangerous to Justice (CNN television broadcast, Feb. 29, 1992); Rorie
Sherman, Moving Graphics – Computer Animation Enters Criminal Cases, Nat’l L.J. Apr. 6,
1992, at 1, 32.
118. See Ellenbrogen, supra note 43, at 1099; see also Sherman, supra note 117, at 32.
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quently serves as an expert witness and is unlikely to objectively
critique his own work.119 Accordingly, there is an opportunity and
a strong incentive for these interested parties to prepare CGE in a
biased fashion.120
One author has even suggested that extraneous information in
the animation can contain subliminal messages; for example, that a
litigant is at fault or simply is an evil person.121 Finally, current
software may not be adequate to support the programs employed
by CGE. It has been suggested “[that] the software is sometimes
not sophisticated enough for the accurate depiction of the inputted
technical data.”122 Assuming the above arguments have merit,
cross-examination may not effectively challenge the reliability of
CGE.123 Would it be the vivid visual display or the verbal cross-examination of the display’s codes and logarithms that would have a
lasting effect on the jury? It will likely be the former.
It also has been suggested that the animation process itself
warps images “simply by its production technique.”124 Judge Van
Graafeiland voiced this view in Perma Research and Development v.
Singer, 125 stating that the potential for tampering with the CGE
“presents a real danger of being the vehicle for introducing erroneous, misleading or unreliable evidence.”126 Judge Van Graafeiland
thought it possible that animators themselves might “introduce
speculation” by injecting creativity into a continuous display127 or
making (possibly flawed) personal assumptions about the evidence
displayed.128
18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 159 Side A

119. See Ellenbrogen, supra note 43, at 1099; see also Sherman, supra note 117, at 32.
120. See Ellenbrogen, supra note 43, at 1099.
121. See Ellenbrogen, supra note 43, at 1101 n.170.
122. See Berkoff, supra note 15, at 852. See also Paul Marcotte, Animated Evidence,
A.B.A. J., Dec. 1989, at 52, 55.
123. See Sharon Panian, Comment, Truth, Lies, and Videotape: Are Current Federal
Rules of Evidence Adequate?, 21 SW. U. L. REV. 1199, 1212 (1992) (quoting Eli Chernow,
From the Bench: Video the Courtroom – More Than a Talking Head, LITIG., Fall 1988, at 4).
124. See Ellenbrogen, supra note 43, at 1100 n.161.
125. Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1976) (Van Graafeiland J., dissenting) (1976). Although this case dealt with computer simulations, Judge
Van Graafeiland’s concerns apply to animations with just as much force.
126. Perma Research, 542 F.2d at 125 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting Jerome J. Roberts, A
Practitioner’s Primer of Computer-Generated Evidence, 41 U.CHI. L. REV. 254, 255-56 (1974)).
127. See Ellenbrogen, supra note 43, at 1099.
128. See id. at 1099-1100.
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Human error may also distort animations because it is an individual who actually enters the information into the computer.129 As
one accident-reconstruction expert explains, “an animation artist
can make a car fly. . .there are some so-called experts out there who
may be 50 percent or more off. Animation is only as good as the
information put into it.”130 In sum, the production process itself
may cause additional error and prejudice.131 This danger is magnified by the difficulty of discovering process errors, coupled with, as
stated earlier, the tendency of humans to “see what they believe.”132
E. Persuasive techniques used in other fields employing animation
Additional techniques may subtly enhance an animation’s persuasiveness.133 For example, studies have shown that regular use of
color is a factor in the recognition of an object.134 High contrast
colors are more likely to attract a juror’s attention; certain combinations of colors can reduce the impact of the message or convey the
wrong message.135 Color-coding can enhance comprehensibility
and recall for the jury.136 Failure to present appropriately colored
evidence effectively can disadvantage a party because the jury may
recall the opponent’s superior animation more clearly.137 The im-
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129. See id. at 1099 (quoting Rorie Sherman, Moving Graphics – Computer Animation
Enters Criminal Cases, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 6, 1992, at 1).
130. Marcotte, supra note 122, at 52, 56 (quoting Arthur Damask, a physicist at
Queens College in New York).
131. See Ellenbrogen, supra note 43, at 1099-1102. Forensic Technologies International, one of the largest creators of CGE, has even expressed this sentiment. They have
stated that the computer animators’ evidence will make errors that can significantly
affect the outcome of cases.
132. See Borelli, supra note 1, at 455; see also Ellenbrogen, supra note 43; Roger
Parloff, Now Showing in a Courtroom Near You, AM. LAW, May 1990, at 4, 10, 12.
133. See Galves, supra note 11, at 299. See also Weinreb, supra note 13, at 418.
134. See Aura Hanna & Roger Remington, The Representation of Color and Form in
Long-Term Memory, 24 MEMORY & COGNITION 322-330 (1996) (finding that when test
subjects were shown items in color first and then the same objects in black and white,
the colored items were easier to recall); see also Cope Thomas, Computer Generated Animation: Identifying New and Subtle Prejudicial Special Effects, 74 FLA. B.J., Dec. 2000, at 52,
53.
135. VINSON, supra note 69, at 199.
136. Id.
137. See Thomas, supra note 134, at 52-53.
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pact color has on the eye and mind, coupled with the possible biased intentions of the CGE producer, may cause inequity.138
Repetition is another factor that CGE can exploit.139 Advertising research shows that repetition improves memory, augments
viewer assurance, and encourages the viewer to respond favorably
to the communication.140 The same principles apply to CGE. Running the CGE for an optimal length of time and repeating the same
event multiple times should enhance memory.141 The cumulative
effect of the repeated portrayal may magnify the prejudicial effect
of the CGE without improving its message, which should be the sole
objective of CGE.142
Visual metaphors143 also may be unfairly prejudicial.144 One
author explained the danger by detailing the visual metaphor used
by a chemical treatment plant defending an action for alleged
water contamination:

138. See Weinreb, supra note 13, at 418-19.
139. See Thomas, supra note 134, at 53.
140. See Surendra N. Singh & Linville Ajay Sukdial, Enhancing the Efficacy of Split
Thirty-Second Television Commercials: An Encoding Variability Application, 24 J. ADVERTISING
24 (1995).
141. See Thomas, supra note 134, at 53.
142. See id. But see Florida v. Pierce, 671 So.2d 186, 191 (1996) (no undue emphasis
placed upon an animation which was shown to the jury for a total of six minutes in the
course of an 11 day trial).
143. See Thomas, supra note 134, at 53-54.
144. PAUL MESSARIS, VISUAL PERSUASION: THE ROLE OF IMAGES IN ADVERTISING 7
(1997).
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First, the animation extracted a three-dimensional
rectangular portion of the contaminated soil, measuring
10 feet long and 50 feet wide. This portion was then
twisted as one would “wring out” water from a wet towel.
Groundwater from the soil was represented in the form of
large water drops falling into a tunnel and then into three
train tank cars, for a total of 25,000 gallons. From the
tanks, the contaminated groundwater was drained into
another funnel and into a long tube with a flame under it.
Here, the groundwater was distilled and the contaminant
was extracted. The extracted groundwater then fell into a
small cup held by a person. In short, the process started
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with 25,000 gallons of groundwater and ended with a halfcup of contaminant.145

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Thomas, supra note 134, at 53-54.
Id. at 54.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Thomas, supra note 134, at 54.
See id.
See id.
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This animation may cause unfair prejudice in two ways. First,
by using tanks and measuring cups as visual metaphors, the jury
may infer that given the large amount of groundwater, only a very
small amount of contaminant, one small measuring cup full, was
spilled.146 This small quantity, however, could in fact be a “lethal
amount.”147 Second, the proportional image of groundwater compared to contaminant may give rise to an emotional response from
the viewer.148 The viewer might be astounded that only a half-cup
of contaminant remained after the waste disposal practices of the
plant. Alternately, the jury may resent the plaintiff for bringing an
action based on only a half-cup of contaminant.149 Either response
might inflame the jury, causing a verdict based on sentiment rather
than a weighing of material facts.150
In addition, allowing an animation to “violate reality” can have
a similar misleading effect. Violating reality can be done in two
distinct ways.151 First, animations can “fly” the jury through the portrayed events with different camera angles. For example, the jury
can travel just behind and above the speeding truck, or in the
driver’s seat, or may have a ground level or even an underground
view.152 Second, the animation can be seen on a split screen, showing two different views at once. For example, in one portion of the
screen, the viewer can see an airplane taking off. In another portion, the jury can see the mannequin pilot pulling back on the control stick, while viewing the interior mechanical workings of the
aircraft. Also, visual obstructions can fade in and out, revealing the
inner workings of the airplane.153 Despite the great detail and
range provided by these displays, each of the visual manipulations
described above supplies jurors with only an approximation of how
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the event occurred.154 The animation is only an “artfully planned
and staged presentation promoting one party’s unproven theory.”155 These visual displays may cause “technology shock,”156
which results in an unforgettable and more favorable viewing
experience.157
IV.

TOWARD BETTER REGULATION
A.

OF

CGE

Guidelines for the Use of CGE

154. See id.
155. O’Flaherty, supra note 2.
156. Thomas, supra note 134, at 54. “Technology Shock” is described as a situation
where the juror pays greater attention as the brain deals with the new medium.
157. See MESSARIS, supra note 144, citing R.N. SHEPARD, MIND SIGHTS: ORIGINAL VISUAL ILLUSIONS, AMBIGUITIES, AND OTHER ANOMALIES (1990).
158. VINSON, supra note 69, at 198-99.
159. VINSON, supra note 69, at 198-99.
160. See Thomas, supra note 134, at 53.
161. VINSON, supra note 69. The most effective form of communication is by verbal
and visual testimony combined.
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Given all of the potential dangers described above, a court
must be very careful in making the admission decision. I propose
the following simple and practical substantive and procedural
guidelines for a judge to follow.
Gestalt principles are useful when deciding whether the CGE
accurately depicts the event in question. Since area, closedness,
continuation and symmetry158 all may make a part of a picture look
like the whole when improperly manipulated, the court must consider these elements carefully. The animation, as well as any visual
metaphors contained in the display, should only be admitted upon
a showing of authenticity and accuracy. This can be accomplished
in two ways: 1) the jury could be told the actual dimensions as they
watch the display and again, prior to deliberations; and 2) the actual measurements can be depicted on the animated display itself.
Multiple verbal and visual reminders of the true dimensions make it
less likely that the jurors will disregard reality.
In addition, proximity in the CGE159 and the use of visual metaphors160 in the animation should note the distance being depicted. By combining words with narrative visual display,161 the jury
will not be able to disregard the actual measurements, which the
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162. See O’Flaherty, supra note 2.
163. See Thomas, supra note 134, at 53.
164. JJ Goodell, Some Thoughts on Color, (Apr. 5, 2003), available at http://www.
goodellgroup.com/color.html. In the advertising context, “It is known that the color
red inspires impulsive buying. Our eyes are drawn to the color like ducks to water. Just
walk into any supermarket and look at the color most often used on products. It’s red.
The next one is yellow. Both colors tend to raise your blood pressure just a tad and
dilate your pupils. They cause excitement, which goes to prove one thing: color affects
us.” If this happens to ordinary people as they food shop, by analogy, the same impetus
is at work in the courtroom.
165. See Thomas, supra note 134, at 53.
166. See Singh & Sukdial, supra note 140.
167. See id.
168. See Berkoff, supra note 15, at 850-52.
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CGE may distort. With the actual numbers stated, the jury may
overcome its tendency to believe what it sees162 if the numbers simply do not make the event plausible.
A judge must also be wary of the use of color. Although the
use of color is not per se prejudicial,163 it is clear that color assists a
jury in recalling the animation over other evidence.164 The courtroom should be a level playing field. Thus, a judge should allow
color only when it is necessary and probative. Examples of an appropriate use of color could include depicting night and day or the
color of cars in an automobile accident.165 Color should be used to
mimic the actual scene it depicts and no more. To combat the danger that color may cause the jury to give the animation excess
weight, the judge should instruct the jury that all evidence should
be given the same weight and represents only one party’s view of
the disputed event. Such an instruction will re-emphasize to the
jury the legal and equitable importance of considering all evidence
in the record, not only that which is easier to recall.
Repetition in CGE also warrants judicial scrutiny. As noted
above, repetition makes television commercials more effective. Several repetitions of a commercial tend to assure the consumer that
the seller believes in the product and is willing to stand by it.166
Moreover, television commercials that run for two 15-second
lengths are more effective than one-30 second segment.167 Judges
should not allow counsel to repeat the same animation over and
over.168 Judges should also limit stop-action, which allows the proponent to emphasize favorable segments of the animation while de-
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emphasizing unfavorable portions.169 By allowing repeated rewind
and fast-forward, the time frame of the event may be distorted by
lengthening or shortening the elapsed time.170 Judicial discretion,
not counsel’s strategy, should dictate the number of times the display should run.
B. The Maryland Experience
In 1998, the Maryland Court of Appeals adopted model rules
proposed by the state’s Standing Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure.171 The model rules addressed, inter alia, the standards and procedure for admitting CGE.172 The Committee concluded that the existing rules of evidence were sufficiently flexible
to provide adequate control of the admissibility of computer generated displays; however, they also adopted new procedural rules to
afford courts the most effective and least prejudicial method of implementing computer technology in the courtroom.173 Quite aptly,
the Maryland Committee limited the definition of CGE to include
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169. See id.
170. See id.
171. This court is the Maryland State Court of Appeals. M.D. CONST. Art. IV, § 18.
(The Court of Appeals is empowered to regulate the practice and procedure in, and the
judicial administration of, the courts of this State). Under Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article § 13-301, the Court of Appeals may appoint a standing committee of lawyers, judges, and other persons competent in judicial practice, procedure, or
administration to assist the Court in the exercise of its rulemaking power. The Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, often referred to simply as the
Rules Committee, was appointed originally in 1946 to succeed an ad hoc Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure created in 1940. Its members meet regularly to consider proposed amendments and additions to the Maryland Rules of Procedure and
submit recommendations for change to the Court of Appeals. Maryland’s approach is
worth noting because it proposed the most detailed and substantial changes. For more
information, see generally Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/rules (last modified Mar. 7, 2002).
172. The Maryland committee proposed other rules that are not discussed
throughout this paper. The committee provided interesting proposals on the consideration of what rule should apply to exhibits that are taken to the jury room. For a thorough explanation of all the rules debated by the Maryland committee, see Carbine &
McLain, supra note 10; see also MD. RULE 2-504.3, adopted on Feb. 10, 1998. Moreover,
the committee declared that the rules discussed throughout this section of the note are
not applicable to criminal defendants. The inapplicability was related to the defendant’s right to a speedy trial, the lower emphasis on discovery in criminal proceedings
as compared to civil proceedings, and the possible unconstitutionality mandating disclosure from an accused.
173. Carbine & McLain, supra note 10, at 46-47.
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174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 28.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 36-37.
Id. at 37.
Carbine & McLain., supra note 10, at 37.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 39-40.
Id. at 35.
Carbine & McLain, supra note 10, at 35.
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“forms of computer-generated evidence known as computer animations and computer simulations, as well as photographs produced
by non-conventional digital cameras.”174 This limitation was wise;
there is no need for a broad, over-inclusive definition that would
encompass other forms of evidence the courts have handled more
easily.175
The Maryland rules provide for pretrial notice of CGE so that
objections may be made and ruled upon before trial.176 If there is
no applicable scheduling order in the given court, notice must be
received at least 90 days prior to trial.177 Disclosure is not required
if the CGE is to be used solely for argument purposes; however,
whether the graphic can be used in the opening statement or for
rebuttal is left entirely to judicial discretion.178
The right to discovery of CGE is automatic once notice is
given.179 The opponent has 60 days to object to the validity and
reliability of the CGE.180 Once an objection is filed, the court must
hold a hearing to rule on the objection.181 Assuming compliance
with applicable rules, the item will be admitted, and the weight
given to it will be determined by the jury.182 This rule eliminates
the need for a pretrial hearing to examine the credibility of the
underlying information.183 Using the 60-day window provided, the
CGE opponent need not await a mid-trial ruling. If flaws in the
CGE are identified, the court may exclude the evidence altogether,
excise the offending portions, or provide the proponent of the
CGE an opportunity to cure the incorrect elements of the display
before trial.184 The rules also put the burden on the proponent of
the evidence to preserve it for the record, as the fact-finder viewed
it.185
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If an expert is needed to challenge the validity of the CGE, and
the opponent of the CGE cannot afford to employ one, the court
may appoint an expert and allocate the costs to the parties as it sees
fit.186 This rule is necessary because animations and experts are
expensive, which may cause parties to forgo using CGE.187 Litigants
with limited budgets may feel compelled to settle when faced with
opponents who are able to afford animated displays.188 Maryland
sought to level the legal playing field.189
The Maryland Committee chose not to require particular jury
instructions.190 The Committee did, however, suggest some limited
instruction:191

186. Id. at 35.
187. O’Flaherty, supra note 2.
188. See Selback, supra note 91, at 361.
189. See Selback, supra note 91, at 361 (“A party opting to present a traditional case
will often be prejudiced by the use of computer-generated evidence by the other
side.”).
190. Carbine & McLain, supra note 10, at 26-27.
191. Id. at 26-27. It should be noted that the Maryland Standing Committee included simulations as well as animations in the jury instruction proposal.
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1. Limited Purpose
You [are about to see] a computer [animation] that
is being offered by the [party]. This [animation] is being
admitted only for the limited purpose of [illustrating [witness’s] testimony] [illustrating [the party’s] theory of the
case] [showing results of experiments or tests conducted
by or on behalf of [the party]] [showing the basis of [an
expert witness’ opinion]]. The computer [animation] is
not itself evidence.
2. Weight
[Regarding assumptions], in evaluating what weight,
if any, to give to the testimony that relies on the computer
[animation], bear in mind [the principal assumptions underlying the exhibit, e.g., that it is predicated on [the
party’s] version of the facts; that the facts are in dispute;
that the exhibit is no better than the assumptions on
which it rests]. It is for you to decide whether those assumptions are warranted.
[Regarding known inaccuracies], bear in mind also
[any noteworthy differences between the exhibit and the
facts at issue – for example, that the exhibit does not pur-
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port to be drawn to scale or include all (or certain specific) variables.

I have several additional suggestions. Although Maryland
chose not to adopt the jury instruction, I propose that the limited
instruction should be given before the trial begins and prior to deliberations if the CGE is admitted into evidence. I would also add
to the instruction that the exhibit has designated actual distances
and measurements that should be considered with as much weight
as the animation itself.
Instructions of this sort would focus the jurors on the issue at
hand and not on the medium through which the evidence is
presented. Although it is difficult to make this distinction, the instructions will ensure that the jurors are aware of the potential for
CGE to mislead. The instruction, at a minimum, will remind the
jury of their duty as fact-finders to weigh carefully all of the proffered evidence.
Finally, requiring judges, counsel and law students to become
familiar with the uses, applications, and potential dangers of
animated displays will help make animations more effective and less
prejudicial.192 To accomplish this goal, judges should attend seminars on the use of computer technology in the courtroom. Law
students should be encouraged, if not required, to take a class on
technology, persuasion and the law.193 The knowledge they acquire will increase their capacity to present their clients’ cases forcefully and effectively.
18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 163 Side B

192. See Galves, supra note 11, at 274-86.
193. Classes such as these are found at New York Law School in the form of electives. A student can take such classes as Visual Persuasion or Law, Technology & Democracy. William & Mary School of Law has taken one step further, requiring all
students to take a class on technology and its function in the court during their third
year of law school. “‘Beginning with the class of 1999, the William and Mary School of
Law added a mandatory courtroom technical training to the legal skills curriculum,
effectively making it a graduation requirement.’” See Weinreb, supra note 13, 424 n.186
(quoting Frederic I. Lederer).
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FOR THE
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FUTURE

The use of CGE is bound to increase in the near future.194
The judiciary has successfully integrated new technologies195 in the
past, such as photography, lie detectors, and DNA evidence. With
further research on CGE196 and appropriate rules and guidelines,
there is no reason why CGE cannot become an integral and effective tool for presenting evidence in the courtroom.
The ability to incorporate special effects into animated displays
poses dangers. The technology is subtle197 and constantly improving.198 Moreover, deceptive computer tactics are not well understood by the legal community.199 Thus, any new rule should
account for the sophistication of the animation production process
as well as the susceptibility of jurors to manipulation. By applying
social science principles, technology can be controlled and harnessed to assist in the pursuit of justice.200
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194. See Berkoff, supra note 15, at 855 (“As a tool . . . computer simulations have
revolutionized much of today’s tort litigation. They are here to stay, and those persons
associated with computer simulations must take the necessary steps to solve the many
problems surrounding them.”). Moreover, even newer technology such as holograms
will present many more complex problems. Thus, it is imperative for us to evenhandedly apply an evidentiary foundation that can be flexible enough to incorporate new
technological change and growth.
195. See Judicial Conference Nixes Cameras in the Courtroom, 67 DEF. COUNS. J. 429, 429
(2000) (quoting Chief Judge Becker) (“The federal courts have shown strong leadership in the continuing effort to modernize the litigation process. This has been particularly true of the federal judiciary’s willingness to embrace new technologies, such as
electronic case filing and access, videoconferencing and electronic evidence presentation systems.”).
196. See Feigenson & Dunn, supra note 5.
197. See Thomas, supra note 134, at 54.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See Weinreb, supra note 13, at 447 (“[W]ith checking technology in place and
proper principles in mind, judges and juries will be able to establish outer limits over
their control and ensure that society continues to receive true justice.”).
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